Economics is a social science. It is concerned with human beings and the social systems by which they organize their activities to satisfy basic material needs (e.g., food, shelter, clothing) and nonmaterial wants (e.g., education, knowledge, spiritual fulfillment). Because they are social scientists, economists face the some what unusual situation in which the objects of their studies—human beings in the ordinary business of life—and their own activities are rooted in the same social context. Unlike the physical sciences, the social science of economics can claim neither scientific laws nor universal truths. In economics there can only be tendencies, and even these are subject to great variations in different countries and cultures and at different times. Many so-called general economic models are in fact based on a set of implicit assumptions about human behavior and economic relationships that may have little or no connection with the realities of developing economies. To this extent, their generality and objectivity may be more assumed than real. Economic investigations and analyses cannot simply be lifted out of their institutional, social, and political context, especially when one must deal with the human dilemmas of hunger, poverty, and ill health that plague so much of the world's population.
It is necessary, therefore, to recognize from the outset that ethical or normative value premises about what is or is not desirable are central features of the economic discipline in general and of development economics in particular. The very concepts of economic development and modernization represent implicit as well as explicit value premises about desirable goals for achieving what Mahatma Gandhi once called the "realization of the human potential." Concepts or goals such as economic and social equality, the elimination of poverty, universal education, rising levels of living, national independence, modernization of institutions, political and economic participation, grassroots democracy, self-reliance, and personal fulfillment all derive from subjective value judgments about what is good and desirable and what is not. So too, for that matter, de other values—for example, the sanctity of private property, however acquired, and the right of individuals to accumulate unlimited personal wealth; the preservation of traditional hierarchical social institutions and rigid, inegalitarian class structures; and the supposed "natural right" of some to lead while others follow.
When we deal in Parts Two and Three with such major issues of development as poverty, inequality, unemployment, population growth, rural stagnation, and environmental decay, the mere identification of these topics as problems conveys the value judgment that their improvement or elimination is desirable and therefore good. That there is widespread agreement among many different groups of people-politicians, academics, and ordinary citizens—that these are desirable goals does not alter the fact that they arise not only out of a reaction to an objective empirical or positive analysis of what is but also ultimately from a subjective or normative value judgment about what should be.
It follows that value premises, however carefully disguised, are an inherent component of both economic analysis and economic policy. Economics cannot be value-free in the same sense as, say, physics or chemistry. Thus the validity of economic analysis and the correctness of economic prescriptions should always be evaluated in light of the underlying assumptions or value premises. Once these subjective values have beer agreed on by a nation or, more specifically, by those who are responsible for national decision making, specific development goals (e.g., greater income equality) and corresponding public policies (e.g., taxing higher incomes at higher rates) based on "objective" theoretical and quantitative analyses can be pursued. However, where serious value conflicts and disagreements exist among decision makers, the possibility of a consensus about desirable goals or appropriate policies is considerably diminished. In either case, it is essential, especially in the field of development economics, that one's value premises always be made clear.
0 Comments